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* Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. Theauthor thanks the numerous participants at the Symposium who offered suggestions.1 See Larry Kramer, What’s a Constitution for Anyway?, 46 Case W. Res. L.Rev. 885, 919 (1996). 2 See Stephen R. McAllister, Is There a Judicially Enforceable Limit toCongressional Power under the Commerce Clause?, 44 U. Kan. L. Rev. 217, 229(1996). 3 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 4 See T homas Reed Powell, The Child Labor Law, the Tenth Amendment, andthe Commerce Clause, 3 S.L.Q. 175, 201 (1918) (explaining how the power ofCongress expands under the Commerce Clause as the market becomes moreintegrated); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 56-57 (1990) (noting thatCongress now may regulate the “most trivial and local activities” if all that mattersis whether the activity has an effect on interstate commerce). 
Citation:  66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1198 (1998)Symposium Textualism and the Constitution Textualism and Federalism TRANSLATING FEDERALISM: A TEXTUALIST REACTION Gregory E. Maggs* I. Introduction       Patterns of commerce in this country have changed remarkably sincethe states ratified the Constitution in 1789.  Two centuries ago, manybusinesses were localized because distant transactions were impractical.1Over the past two centuries, however, technological advances havediminished the significance of geographic separation. As a result, enter-prises in different states now often compete with one another and very fewcommercial activities have only local effects. Indeed, the level of integra-tion in our economy today surely exceeds what anyone could have foreseenin the eighteenth century.2       The increasingly interstate character of commerce has altered thebalance of power between the states and the federal government regardingregulation of the economy.  Although Congress’s power to regulate“Commerce . . . among the several States”3  might have had limitedimportance when interstate commerce was less prevalent, the Clause hasbecome increasingly significant as markets have become so closelyconnected. Now almost any substantial economic activity affects commercein more than one state.4 
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5 Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v Lopez, 1995 Sup.Ct. Rev. 125. 6 See id . at 130 . 7 See id . 8 See id . 9 See id . 10 514  U.S. 549 (1995). 11 Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45 (1990) (codified asamended at 18 U.S.C. §  922(q)(2)(A) (1994)). 12 See Lessig, supra note 5, at 194-214. 13 See id . at 130-31. 14 See id . 
      Professor Lawrence Lessig recently analyzed this development.  In hisrich and important article, Translating Federalism: United States v Lopez5(“Translating Federalism”), Lessig strives to explain how the SupremeCourt has interpreted and should interpret the Commerce Clause to addressthe changing character of our national economy. In the process, headvances two ambitious and provocative claims.       Lessig first asserts that the Supreme Court has sought to control theexpansion of federal power by “translating” the Commerce Clause insteadof following the Clause’s textual meaning.6  He explains that the Court hasnot allowed Congress to regulate all “Commerce . . . among the severalStates” *1199 because that literal reading of the Commerce Clause wouldgive Congress the ability to regulate almost everything, and the Framersnever intended for Congress to have so much power.7  Instead, accordingto Lessig, the Court has attempted to translate--or update--the Clause tomaintain a balance of power between the federal and state governments as“envisioned in the framing generation.”8  In this way, he says, the Courtmay preserve the original function of the Commerce Clause despitedeparting from the Clause’s literal meaning.9  Lessig cites the Court’srecent decision in United States v. Lopez,10  which struck down theGun-Free School Zones Act of 199011  (“the Act”), as his principal exampleof how the Supreme Court translates the Commerce Clause.12       Second, Lessig proclaims that, as a normative matter, the SupremeCourt should engage actively in this type of translation.13  In his view, theCourt shows greater fidelity to the Constitution by reading it in ways thatpreserve the document’s original function than the Court exhibits by strictlyfollowing the document’s text. 14 Lessig explains that translation serves to“reestablish something ratifiers of the Constitution chose, eroded by
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15 Id. at 135. Professor Lessig has developed his theory of translation in a seriesof articles. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1365(1997); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993);Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan.L. Rev. 395 (1995). 16 See infra Part III. 17 See infra Part IV. 18 See Lessig, supra note 5, at 131 (noting that “[f]idelity is the dominantmodality of constitutional interpretation”). 19 See id . 20 See M ichael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 381, 381 (1997). 21 See id . at 383-85. 22 See id . at 385-86. 
changes that no one chose, to ensure that something of the original structuresurvives these unchosen changes.”15       Lessig’s article makes a substantial contribution to the ongoing debateabout how courts should react to changed circumstances when decidingconstitutional cases.  Ultimately, however, I disagree with both of Lessig’sclaims.  The Supreme Court, in my view, did not translate the CommerceClause in Lopez, but instead decided the case in a textualist manner.16  Inaddition, for reasons that I will explain, the Court generally should read theClause according to the text’s original meaning and should not attempt totranslate it.17 II. Lessig’s Contribution       Lessig’s theory warrants attention, even from textualists who disagreewith his ultimate conclusions, because Lessig agrees with one of text-ualism’s central assumptions: the Supreme Court’s decisions must bejudged by their *1200 faithfulness to the Constitution.18  As describedabove, Lessig supports attempts to translate the Commerce Clause becausehe believes that the Court often can show greater fidelity to the Constitutionthrough translation than it could by reading the Constitution’s text literallyand ignoring historical developments. 19      Not all scholars share Lessig’s premise about maintaining fidelity.  Forinstance, in response to Lessig and others, Professor Michael J. Klarmanrecently has argued that the Constitution does not deserve our loyalty atall.20    He reasons that we differ substantially from the Framers in ideologyand material circumstances, 21 noting that political assumptions andeconomic conditions have changed a great deal since the 1780s. 22 For thesereasons, Klarman contends that the Framers simply do not have “much of
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23 Id. at 387. 24 See Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 100 (1993) (arguing that“agreement on the document many generations ago is insufficient” to warrantloyalty to it in modern times). 25 See Gregory E . Maggs, Yet Still Partial to It, 103 Yale L.J. 1627 (1994)(making a related argument in response to Sunstein). 26 See Lessig, supra note 5, at 127. 
relevance to say about how we should govern ourselves today.”23  ProfessorCass Sunstein recently has expressed similar skepticism about fidelity tothe Constitution.24       Klarman and others who disagree with Lessig’s insistence on fidelityhave an interesting theory.  Perhaps, after all these years, our Constitutiondoes not warrant our loyalty for the various reasons that Klarman andothers point out.  Yet, for better or for worse, the Justices already havedecided that the Constitution deserves fidelity; indeed, they swore touphold and defend the document upon taking office.  Consequently, inrendering their decisions, the Justices primarily care about how they shouldexhibit their allegiance to the Constitution, not whether the documentshould continue to govern us.25  Lessig has something to say about thisquestion; Klarman and other critics of fidelity do not.       Lessig’s effort to evaluate the Court’s work in terms of its faithfulnessto the Constitution leads to the principal contribution of his article.  Headds to the debate about textualism by observing that judges might striveto be faithful to the Constitution in more than just one way.  Textualistsshould keep this important idea in mind.       In legal thinking, disagreements often arise not because people havedifferent goals, but because they have different conceptions of the samegoal.  Consider, for example, the desire for equality in the law.  One wayto promote equality is to treat everyone the same.  Another is to treat peopledifferently based on their differing circumstances.  Both methods promoteequality; they simply advance alternative visions of what equality means.The same idea holds true for the goal of fidelity.  As Lessig explains, theSupreme Court can be faithful to the Constitution in two ways.  The Court*1201 can follow the text strictly or it can attempt to translate the text sothat the Constitution serves the functions that the Framers envisioned.26Although the two approaches may lead to different outcomes, textualistcritics cannot fault the Court for unfaithfulness merely because the Justices
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27 See infra Part IV. 28 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 29 See id . at 551 . 30 Pub.  L.  No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844 (1990) (codified asamended at 18 U.S.C. §  922(q)(2)(A) (1994)). 31 The Court last struck down a federal statute as exceeding the power ofCongress under the Commerce C lause in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238(1936). 32 See Transcript of Oral Argument, 1994 WL 758950, at *7 (U.S. 1994),United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No. 93-1260). 33 Id. at *8. 
choose one approach over another. Arguments against translation must lieelsewhere. 27 III. Translation in Commerce Clause Cases       Although Lessig makes a valuable contribution with his discussion ofhow translation might maintain fidelity, I disagree with his principal claimthat the Court recently has been attempting to translate the CommerceClause.  Lessig, as noted above, cites United States v. Lopez28  as hisforemost example, but his characterization of the case troubles me. As Iread Lopez, the Court struck down a federal statute based on a textualreading of the Commerce Clause and did not employ translation to reach itsconclusion.       Lopez came before the Supreme Court in 1994.  In the case, the Justiceshad to decide whether Congress had the power to enact the Gun-FreeSchool Zones Act of 1990.29  The Act prohibited an individual “knowinglyto possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonablecause to believe, is a school zone.”30  Although the Court had not struckdown a federal statute under the Commerce Clause in more than half acentury,31  this case seemed different from the start.       During the oral argument, it appeared that the government was goingto lose and that the Court was going to strike down the Act under a literalreading of the text of the Constitution.  Justice Scalia acknowledged thatthe Court had not always been “too strict” in determining the reach of theCommerce Clause.32    He candidly acknowledged that “if Congress sayssome commercial activity is interstate commerce, or affects interstatecommerce, that’s okay. But here you have regulation of something that isnot commercial activity in any sense of the word, but merely the possessionof an item.”33 
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34 See id . at *8-10 . 35 See id . at *10-20. 36 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (quoting U.S. Const. art.I, § 8, cl. 3). 37 22 U .S. (9 W heat.) 1  (1824). 38 494  U.S. 1 (1990). 39 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-63. 40 See id . at 561 . 
      Solicitor General Drew Days faltered at this point in the argument.  Hecould not explain in a manner convincing to the Justices how the statuteinvolved either “commerce” or any activity “among the states.” 34 He alsocould not explain satisfactorily how Congress’s power under the CommerceClause would be limited in any way if the Court interpreted the Clause asgranting Congress the power to pass the Act. Solicitor General Days couldidentify few areas that the Commerce Clause would not permit Congressto *1202 reach if the definition of commerce was so broad that it includedpossession of a firearm.35       After the oral argument, the Court’s decision to invalidate the Act cameas little surprise.  In the first paragraph of its opinion, the Court announcedits conclusion that “[t]he Act neither regulates a commercial activity norcontains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way tointerstate commerce. We hold that the Act exceeds the authority ofCongress ‘[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .”’ 36In explaining its holding, the majority opinion cited Commerce Clausedecisions as old as Gibbons v. Ogden37  and as recent as Preseault v. ICC.38The majority then concluded that there was no precedent interpreting theClause in a way that would encompass gun possession in school zones.39The Act, the Court reasoned, did not address commerce, the instrumentali-ties of commerce, or anything having a substantial effect on commerce.40      Unlike Lessig, I do not see any attempt by the Court to translate theCommerce Clause in order to preserve its function in modern times.  Iwould characterize the Court’s decision as textual because, as the opinion’sinitial paragraph indicates, the holding rests on the literal language of theCommerce Clause.  The Constitution empowers Congress to regulateinterstate commerce, but the Act did not regulate commerce.  In the end, theCourt concluded that something it would not have characterized ascommerce in the eighteenth or nineteenth century likewise should not beviewed as commerce in the twentieth century.  The Court did not update theCommerce Clause to reach its conclusion despite all of the changes thathave produced our modern economy. 
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41 See Lessig, supra note 5, at 195.42 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. 43 The statement also does not indicate that the Court would have departed fromthe text to preserve the function of the Commerce C lause. Indeed, the Court’semphasis on the text of the Clause at the beginning of the opinion makes thatconclusion unlikely. 44 See Lessig, supra note 5, at 197-201. 45 Neither the majority nor the dissent mentioned the Necessary and ProperClause. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549. 46 In fairness to the Court, it should be noted that the Justices might haveoverlooked the Necessary and Proper Clause because of the way the governmentargued the case: the government only mentioned the Necessary and Proper Clausein one cursory footno te in its principal brief. See Brief for Petitioner, 1994 WL242541, at *13 n.4 (U.S. 1994), United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No.93-1260). 
      Lessig offers two counterarguments for why we should consider Lopezan exercise of translation.  First, he contends that the Court was looking fora way to read the Commerce Clause that would preserve for the states someof the power that they enjoyed when the Constitution first took effect.41  Asevidence, he quotes the Court’s statement: “[I]f we were to accept theGovernment’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by anindividual that Congress is without power to regulate.”42       This argument is unpersuasive.  Although the Court’s statement revealsconcern for the original function of the Commerce Clause, it does not showthat the Court engaged in translation.  As noted, the Court held thatpossession of a gun did not constitute commerce--the same conclusion thatit would have reached two centuries ago.  At best, the statement quoted byLessig demonstrates that the Court refused to abandon its originalunderstanding*1203 of the text in part because such a departure wouldchange the text’s function.43       Second, Lessig argues that the Court engaged in translation because itfailed to consider the Necessary and Proper Clause.44  Although the Courtdid overlook this important provision,45  and perhaps deserves criticism forthe omission,46  this fact does not indicate that the Court translated theConstitution. The omission merely shows that the Court did not perform asthorough a textual analysis as it might have--the Court should haveconsidered all of the relevant portions of the Constitution, not just theCommerce Clause.       Lopez, to be sure, is only one case.  Even if the Supreme Court did nottranslate the Commerce Clause in Lopez, it might have sought to translate
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47 See Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the W ritten Constitution: AComment on Professor Lessig’s Theory of Translation, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1435,1436-54 (1997) (arguing that most of the Supreme Court’s important cases have notinvolved translation). 48 See supra Part II. 49 See U .S. Const. amend. VII. 50 See id . art. V (stating the amendment procedure). 51 See id. amend. XX; John Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable, 72 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 470, 483-89 (1997) (describing the history of the adoption of the TwentiethAmendment). 
the Clause in other decisions.  Yet, if Lopez is the best example that Lessigcan offer, translation does not appear to play a central role in CommerceClause cases.47 IV. The Problems with Translation       Lessig, as noted, deserves credit for recognizing that the Supreme Courtcan be faithful to the Constitution in more than one way.48  The Court mayattempt to adhere to the Constitution either by following the text’s literalmeaning or by attempting to find a new meaning that preserves the text’soriginal function. I disagree, however, with Lessig’s belief that translationis better than textualism. In my view, translation has two substantialproblems that textualism does not: it is unnecessary and it is overlydifficult. A. The Need for Translation       No one would deny that legal rules, even those in the Constitution,might become antiquated after two centuries.  The Seventh Amendment, forexample, still requires a jury trial in any civil case involving more thantwenty dollars,49  even though twenty dollars is not worth nearly as muchnow as it was in 1791 when the Amendment took effect. The SupremeCourt, however, does not have to update constitutional provisions throughtranslation in order to deal with problems caused by the passage of time.Instead, when *1204 developments warrant a change in the Constitution’stext, Congress and the states may amend it under the procedures stated inArticle V.50       Amendments have updated antiquated portions of the Constitution ona number of occasions.  For example, after modern transportation allowedthe President to travel more quickly to Washington, the TwentiethAmendment moved inauguration day to a date closer to the election.51Likewise, when the government needed more revenue than the original
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52 See U .S. Const. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting unapportioned direct taxes); Pollockv. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (striking down an incomestatute as an unapportioned direct tax). 53 See U .S. Const. amend. XVI. 54 Lessig mentions amendment of the Constitution only once, stating in passingthat the Supreme Court must defend “commitment[s]” in the original Constitution“until changed by amendment.” See Lessig, supra note 5, at 177-78. 55 See Stephen M. Griffin, The Problem of Constitutional Change, 70 Tul. L.Rev. 2121, 2136 (1996); Klarman, supra note 20, at 387. Other writers haveadvanced variations of this argument in explaining why the Supreme Court hasplayed  such a substantial role in creating constitutional law. 56 The twenty dollar limitation in the Seventh Amendment is an example. 
rules on taxation realistically could produce,52  the Sixteenth Amendmentempowered Congress to tax income.53       Lessig does not address the alternative of amending the Constitution inTranslating Federalism.54  He might respond, however, by arguing that theArticle V amendment process cannot take translation’s place becauseadopting an amendment is an onerous undertaking and thus seldomoccurs.55  This line of reasoning, however, is not very convincing for tworeasons.       First, the difficulty of amending the Constitution should not beoverstated.  In the 209 years since the Constitution’s ratification in 1789,we have had twenty-seven amendments.  History thus shows that Congressand the States can change the Constitution when they really considerchanges to be necessary.       Second, even if cumbersome, the amendment process still can sufficeas a substitute for translation because the Constitution needs very littleupdating.  Much of the Constitution has a timeless quality that no one seesa pressing need to change.  Although the Framers should have thought morecarefully when drafting some parts of the Constitution,56  they generallychose rules that we all can live with today even when read literally. As aresult, the difficulty of amending the Constitution does not matter a greatdeal because we seldom have reason to invoke the process.       Ironically, if employed regularly, the translation technique actuallymight hinder efforts to modernize the Constitution.  Political branches ofthe government might see no need for a constitutional amendment thatwould protect a sphere of state power in the area of economic regulation ifthe Court strived to protect states’ rights by translating the CommerceClause.  In the absence of translation, Congress and the states would be
TRANSLATING FEDERALISM: A TEXTUALIST REACTION10
57 See generally Sanford Levinson, Translation: Who Needs It?, 65 Fordham L.Rev. 1457, 1468 (1997) (discussing problems with the practice of translation in theabstract). 58 See Lessig, supra note 5, at 174-76. 59 See id . 60 See id . at 185 . 
forced to confront problems presented by the antiquation of the Constitu-tion. *1205 B. The Difficulty of Translation       In addition to being unnecessary, the translation process that Lessigdescribes leaves many other problems unresolved.  One concern isuncertainty.  How is the Court to know when conditions have changedenough to make necessary the translation of a provision?  If the Courtdecides to translate, what meaning should it adopt?  How should theCourt’s observers evaluate translations?57  I doubt that the Court ever willprovide convincing answers to these questions.       Another problem, which Lessig himself observes, is that translationsoften might appear to be politically motivated.58  When the Court starts todepart from the text, it sometimes seems as if the Court is abandoning itsjudicial role and is becoming a legislature.59  For this reason, as Lessigobserves, the Court often must use covert tools to accomplish translationsthat it desires.60  The Court cannot simply state that it is updating theConstitution.       The textualist approach, combined with the possibility of amendments,does not raise these concerns to the same extent.  Although words can beambiguous and politics certainly can influence how the Supreme Courtreads the Constitution--even when it purports to follow literally thetext--the textualist approach still raises less controversy.  The public knowsthat judges must apply written legal rules and generally feels comfortableevaluating the judiciary’s work.  Judges, accordingly, may cite candidly theConstitution’s text as the basis for their decisions, as the Supreme Court didin the first paragraph of Lopez.  For these reasons, textualism remains abetter method of maintaining fidelity to the Constitution than doestranslation. V. Conclusion       Despite these difficulties with two of the central claims in TranslatingFederalism: United States v Lopez, Lessig has done an invaluable servicein investigating alternative methods of showing fidelity to the Constitution
TRANSLATING FEDERALISM: A TEXTUALIST REACTION 11
61 See Gregory E. Maggs, Innovation in Constitutional Law: The Right toEducation and the Tricks of the Trade, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1038 (1992) (criticizingunderhanded methods of achieving desired results in constitutional law cases). 
when time has dated its provisions.  He has argued convincingly that theJustices might reach different understandings of the Constitution, notthrough trickery,61 but through different conceptions of what it means forthem to uphold and defend the Constitution. 
